Cover Image

Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field

Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evalua...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Koo, Lee Feng, Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila, Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana, Kwan, Yee Min, Yiu, Pang Hung, Wong, Tze Jin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018
Online Access:http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/
https://mscr.org.my/data/journal/journal-20190806143649.pdf
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id my.upm.eprints.73441
record_format eprints
spelling my.upm.eprints.734412020-11-10T07:24:23Z http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/ Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field Koo, Lee Feng Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana Kwan, Yee Min Yiu, Pang Hung Wong, Tze Jin Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evaluate the nature of a homomorphic attack on the Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. The attack can be proven by using extend Euclidean algorithm together with composite and reverse functions of Lucas and Fibonacci sequences. Results showed that common modulus attack can be used to obtain the original plaintexts. Thus, it is dangerous to send a plaintext to two different users using same modulus. Sender must use different modulus to communicate with two different users. International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018 Article PeerReviewed text en http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf Koo, Lee Feng and Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila and Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana and Kwan, Yee Min and Yiu, Pang Hung and Wong, Tze Jin (2018) Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. International Journal of Cryptology Research, 8 (2). pp. 1-10. ISSN 0933-2790 https://mscr.org.my/data/journal/journal-20190806143649.pdf
institution Universiti Putra Malaysia
building UPM Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Putra Malaysia
content_source UPM Institutional Repository
url_provider http://psasir.upm.edu.my/
language English
description Common modulus attack is one of the various homomorphic attacks based on homomorphism nature of cryptosystems. This type of attack requires a plaintext encrypted under same modulus while two encryption keys are relatively prime to each other. In this paper, an investigation was carried out to evaluate the nature of a homomorphic attack on the Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field. The attack can be proven by using extend Euclidean algorithm together with composite and reverse functions of Lucas and Fibonacci sequences. Results showed that common modulus attack can be used to obtain the original plaintexts. Thus, it is dangerous to send a plaintext to two different users using same modulus. Sender must use different modulus to communicate with two different users.
format Article
author Koo, Lee Feng
Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila
Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana
Kwan, Yee Min
Yiu, Pang Hung
Wong, Tze Jin
spellingShingle Koo, Lee Feng
Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila
Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana
Kwan, Yee Min
Yiu, Pang Hung
Wong, Tze Jin
Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
author_facet Koo, Lee Feng
Sarbini, Izzatul Nabila
Naning @ Zin, Fatin Hana
Kwan, Yee Min
Yiu, Pang Hung
Wong, Tze Jin
author_sort Koo, Lee Feng
title Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
title_short Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
title_full Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
title_fullStr Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
title_full_unstemmed Common modulus attack against Lucas based El-Gamal Cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
title_sort common modulus attack against lucas based el-gamal cryptosystem in the elliptic curve group over finite field
publisher International Association for Cryptologic Research
publishDate 2018
url http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/1/LUCAS.pdf
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/73441/
https://mscr.org.my/data/journal/journal-20190806143649.pdf
_version_ 1683232221853384704
score 13.211869

Similar Items