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On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis

Many recently proposed lightweight block ciphers lack security evaluation against generic cryptanalytic attacks such as differential cryptanalysis. In this paper, we contribute towards security evaluation efforts by investigating four lightweight Feistel-based block ciphers including SLIM, LBC-IoT,...

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Main Authors:	Chan Y.Y., Khor C.-Y., Khoo B.T., Teh J.S., Teng W.J., Jamil N.
Other Authors:	58114489900
Format:	Article
Published:	Elsevier Ltd 2024
Subjects:	Differential cryptanalysis LBC-IoT LCB Lightweight block cipher SCENERY SLIM SMT
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id	my.uniten.dspace-34341
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spelling	my.uniten.dspace-343412024-10-14T11:19:10Z On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis Chan Y.Y. Khor C.-Y. Khoo B.T. Teh J.S. Teng W.J. Jamil N. 58114489900 58114490000 58176633100 56579944200 57193064876 36682671900 Differential cryptanalysis LBC-IoT LCB Lightweight block cipher SCENERY SLIM SMT Many recently proposed lightweight block ciphers lack security evaluation against generic cryptanalytic attacks such as differential cryptanalysis. In this paper, we contribute towards security evaluation efforts by investigating four lightweight Feistel-based block ciphers including SLIM, LBC-IoT, SCENERY, and LCB. SLIM claims resistance to differential cryptanalysis since, using a heuristic technique, its designers could only find a 7-round differential trail. Despite having no analysis of security against attacks such as differential cryptanalysis, the designers of LBC-IoT and LCB claimed that their ciphers are secure. Meanwhile, the designers of SCENERY claim that the best 11-round differential trail for the cipher has a probability of 2?66. To substantiate these claims, we propose attacks on all four ciphers based on differential cryptanalysis. We presented practical key recovery attacks on SLIM which can retrieve the final round key for up to 14 rounds with a time complexity of 232. LBC-IoT was found to be weaker against differential cryptanalysis despite sharing many similarities with SLIM, whereby a key recovery attack of up to 19 rounds is possible with time complexity 231. For SCENERY, we found a differential trail of up to 12 rounds with probability 2?60, which was used as the distinguisher for a 13-round key recovery attack. We also discovered that LCB's design lacks nonlinearity, allowing us to easily derive deterministic differential trails regardless of the number of rounds. This flaw allowed us to perform a trivial distinguishing attack using a single known ciphertext. By using a different S-box to address this flaw, LCB is now more resilient to differential cryptanalysis than SLIM and LBC-IoT when using the same number of rounds. Our paper presents new independent cryptanalysis results for these ciphers. � 2023 Final 2024-10-14T03:19:10Z 2024-10-14T03:19:10Z 2023 Article 10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e15257 2-s2.0-85152108960 https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85152108960&doi=10.1016%2fj.heliyon.2023.e15257&partnerID=40&md5=992216b08f07bd1b0600475a8393b567 https://irepository.uniten.edu.my/handle/123456789/34341 9 4 e15257 All Open Access Gold Open Access Green Open Access Elsevier Ltd Scopus
institution	Universiti Tenaga Nasional
building	UNITEN Library
collection	Institutional Repository
continent	Asia
country	Malaysia
content_provider	Universiti Tenaga Nasional
content_source	UNITEN Institutional Repository
url_provider	http://dspace.uniten.edu.my/
topic	Differential cryptanalysis LBC-IoT LCB Lightweight block cipher SCENERY SLIM SMT
spellingShingle	Differential cryptanalysis LBC-IoT LCB Lightweight block cipher SCENERY SLIM SMT Chan Y.Y. Khor C.-Y. Khoo B.T. Teh J.S. Teng W.J. Jamil N. On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
description	Many recently proposed lightweight block ciphers lack security evaluation against generic cryptanalytic attacks such as differential cryptanalysis. In this paper, we contribute towards security evaluation efforts by investigating four lightweight Feistel-based block ciphers including SLIM, LBC-IoT, SCENERY, and LCB. SLIM claims resistance to differential cryptanalysis since, using a heuristic technique, its designers could only find a 7-round differential trail. Despite having no analysis of security against attacks such as differential cryptanalysis, the designers of LBC-IoT and LCB claimed that their ciphers are secure. Meanwhile, the designers of SCENERY claim that the best 11-round differential trail for the cipher has a probability of 2?66. To substantiate these claims, we propose attacks on all four ciphers based on differential cryptanalysis. We presented practical key recovery attacks on SLIM which can retrieve the final round key for up to 14 rounds with a time complexity of 232. LBC-IoT was found to be weaker against differential cryptanalysis despite sharing many similarities with SLIM, whereby a key recovery attack of up to 19 rounds is possible with time complexity 231. For SCENERY, we found a differential trail of up to 12 rounds with probability 2?60, which was used as the distinguisher for a 13-round key recovery attack. We also discovered that LCB's design lacks nonlinearity, allowing us to easily derive deterministic differential trails regardless of the number of rounds. This flaw allowed us to perform a trivial distinguishing attack using a single known ciphertext. By using a different S-box to address this flaw, LCB is now more resilient to differential cryptanalysis than SLIM and LBC-IoT when using the same number of rounds. Our paper presents new independent cryptanalysis results for these ciphers. � 2023
author2	58114489900
author_facet	58114489900 Chan Y.Y. Khor C.-Y. Khoo B.T. Teh J.S. Teng W.J. Jamil N.
format	Article
author	Chan Y.Y. Khor C.-Y. Khoo B.T. Teh J.S. Teng W.J. Jamil N.
author_sort	Chan Y.Y.
title	On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
title_short	On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
title_full	On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
title_fullStr	On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
title_full_unstemmed	On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
title_sort	on the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis
publisher	Elsevier Ltd
publishDate	2024
_version_	1814061050950057984
score	13.222552

On the resistance of new lightweight block ciphers against differential cryptanalysis

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