Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors

International Conference on Man Machine Systems (ICoMMS 2012) organized by School of Mechatronic Engineering, co-organized by The Institute of Engineer, Malaysia (IEM) and Society of Engineering Education Malaysia, 27th - 28th February 2012 at Bayview Beach Resort, Penang, Malaysia.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Waripan, Thisana
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UniMAP) 2012
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Online Access:http://dspace.unimap.edu.my/xmlui/handle/123456789/20489
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spelling my.unimap-204892012-07-19T12:53:51Z Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors Waripan, Thisana Game theory Shippers Two-echelon model Forwarder Stackelberg Collusion Cournot International Conference on Man Machine Systems (ICoMMS 2012) organized by School of Mechatronic Engineering, co-organized by The Institute of Engineer, Malaysia (IEM) and Society of Engineering Education Malaysia, 27th - 28th February 2012 at Bayview Beach Resort, Penang, Malaysia. This paper considers the optimal solutions under cooperative circumstance of the two-echelon model among logistic service providers (LSPs) with Stackelberg structure. Assuming duopolistic shippers and oligopolistic forwarders are the shippers are perform as a leader and declare their service to both forwarders to set price and quantity independently under shipper’s scheme. The objective of this paper is to analyze the optimal solutions of the three rival game behaviors: Stackelberg, Collusion and Cournot— on the optimal decisions for the shipper and the oligopolistic forwarders. Thus, the two-echelon profit model is proposed to study the action of the logistics players’ decisions. Numerical examples are exemplified to show the maximum profit decision among three behaviors for each logistic player in four simulated cases. The result of this proposed method would be used as decision supports for LSPs make a pricing decision under their competitive and unclear information situation for optimal benefit. The result indicates that: (i) among three scenarios, the duopolistic forwarders’ action is Stackelberg behavior can carry out the maximum profit. (ii) Collusion game can achieve the maximum profit for Shippers. 2012-07-19T12:51:19Z 2012-07-19T12:51:19Z 2012-02-27 Working Paper p. 1-7 http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/20489 en Proceedings of the International Conference on Man-Machine Systems (ICoMMS 2012) Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UniMAP) School of Mechatronic Engineering
institution Universiti Malaysia Perlis
building UniMAP Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Malaysia Perlis
content_source UniMAP Library Digital Repository
url_provider http://dspace.unimap.edu.my/
language English
topic Game theory
Shippers
Two-echelon model
Forwarder
Stackelberg
Collusion
Cournot
spellingShingle Game theory
Shippers
Two-echelon model
Forwarder
Stackelberg
Collusion
Cournot
Waripan, Thisana
Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
description International Conference on Man Machine Systems (ICoMMS 2012) organized by School of Mechatronic Engineering, co-organized by The Institute of Engineer, Malaysia (IEM) and Society of Engineering Education Malaysia, 27th - 28th February 2012 at Bayview Beach Resort, Penang, Malaysia.
format Working Paper
author Waripan, Thisana
author_facet Waripan, Thisana
author_sort Waripan, Thisana
title Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
title_short Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
title_full Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
title_fullStr Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
title_full_unstemmed Game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
title_sort game theory-based two–echelon logistic models for competitive behaviors
publisher Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UniMAP)
publishDate 2012
url http://dspace.unimap.edu.my/xmlui/handle/123456789/20489
_version_ 1643793087903825920
score 13.222552