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Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.

The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why the headquarters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with the impo...

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Main Authors: Okuda, Shin'ya, Kubota, Takaya, Chujo, Yoshimi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam 2019
Subjects:
Risk management. Risk in industry. Operational risk
Personnel management. Employment management
Online Access:http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/1/29276.pdf
http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/
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spelling my.uitm.ir.292762020-04-03T05:35:48Z http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/ Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo. Okuda, Shin'ya Kubota, Takaya Chujo, Yoshimi Risk management. Risk in industry. Operational risk Personnel management. Employment management The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why the headquarters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with the importance attached to the business unit’s operations. It means when incomplete contracts severely restrict an important business unit’s incentive to invest because of holdup problem, then the headquarters should necessarily provide the business unit with some degree of bargaining power. This result is consistent with the fact that the independence of a business unit (e.g., spin-offs) is a commonly observable practice. Building on our model, independence of the business unit can be interpreted as a consequence of a gradual delegation of authority by the headquarters. Our paper contributes to both of economics and management accounting literature through providing a model concerning to a decision of organizational structure. Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam 2019-08 Article PeerReviewed text en http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/1/29276.pdf Okuda, Shin'ya and Kubota, Takaya and Chujo, Yoshimi (2019) Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo. Asia-Pacific Management Accounting Journal (APMAJ), 14 (2). pp. 105-114. ISSN 2550-1631
institution Universiti Teknologi Mara
building Tun Abdul Razak Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Teknologi Mara
content_source UiTM Institutional Repository
url_provider http://ir.uitm.edu.my/
language English
topic Risk management. Risk in industry. Operational risk
Personnel management. Employment management
spellingShingle Risk management. Risk in industry. Operational risk
Personnel management. Employment management
Okuda, Shin'ya
Kubota, Takaya
Chujo, Yoshimi
Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
description The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why the headquarters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with the importance attached to the business unit’s operations. It means when incomplete contracts severely restrict an important business unit’s incentive to invest because of holdup problem, then the headquarters should necessarily provide the business unit with some degree of bargaining power. This result is consistent with the fact that the independence of a business unit (e.g., spin-offs) is a commonly observable practice. Building on our model, independence of the business unit can be interpreted as a consequence of a gradual delegation of authority by the headquarters. Our paper contributes to both of economics and management accounting literature through providing a model concerning to a decision of organizational structure.
format Article
author Okuda, Shin'ya
Kubota, Takaya
Chujo, Yoshimi
author_facet Okuda, Shin'ya
Kubota, Takaya
Chujo, Yoshimi
author_sort Okuda, Shin'ya
title Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
title_short Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
title_full Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
title_fullStr Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
title_full_unstemmed Why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / Shin'ya Okuda, Takaya Kubota and Yoshimi Chujo.
title_sort why does headquaters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to business units? / shin'ya okuda, takaya kubota and yoshimi chujo.
publisher Universiti Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam
publishDate 2019
url http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/1/29276.pdf
http://ir.uitm.edu.my/id/eprint/29276/
_version_ 1685650497069907968
score 13.2442

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