Principal-agent preferences in imperfect markets: theoretical analysis on Murabahah and Ijarah
This paper aims to determine the optimal contract for the principal and the agent in imperfect markets, when murabahah and ijarah are used. The financial contracting enforceability approach is employed to determine the contract that maximizes the value of the firm subject to agents’ constraints w...
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Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Bank Indonesia Institute
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/1/77575_Principal-agent%20preferences%20in%20imperfect%20markets.pdf http://irep.iium.edu.my/77575/ https://jimf-bi.org/index.php/JIMF/article/view/1050/749 https://doi.org/10.21098/jimf.v5i1.1050 |
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